Can Lawyers Be War Criminals by Markovic, Milan
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2007
Can Lawyers Be War Criminals
Milan Markovic
Texas A&M University School of Law, mmarkovic@law.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Milan Markovic, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals, 20 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 347 (2007).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/85
ESSAY
Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?
MILAN MARKOVIC*
INTRODUCTION
On August 1, 2002, in response to a request from White House Counsel
Alberto Gonzales, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued a memorandum
entitled Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-
2430(A), now commonly known as the "Torture Memo."' The memorandum,
drafted by John Yoo and OLC head Jay S. Bybee, provoked outrage and disgust
among legal professionals and the public-at-large.2 Harold Koh, a professor of
international law and the Dean of Yale Law School, informed the Senate
Judiciary Committee that it was the most erroneous legal opinion he had ever
read.3 A law professor at the University of Virginia claimed that the memo "was
less 'lawyering as usual' than the work of some bizarre literary deconstruction-
ist."'4 In December 2004, the Department of Justice repudiated the Torture
Memo,5 although John Yoo continues to stand by the analysis.6
The August 1 memorandum was not merely an intellectual exercise. After
September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration was determined to stop Al Qaeda,
but the United States lacked human intelligence-spies inside the terrorist
* Associate, Sidley Austin LLP, New York, NY. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center (2006); M.A.,
New York University (2003); B.A., Columbia University (2001). I would like to thank Professor Peter Rubin of
the Georgetown University Law Center and Professor Mark Tushnet of Harvard Law School for their valuable
comments and suggestions.
1. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memo], in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE RoAD To Aau GHRAim 172,
172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS].
2. See generally David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv. 1425, 1455-56
(2005). Jay Bybee is now a judge on the Ninth Circuit while John Yoo is a professor of law at the University of
California at Berkeley. See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 1681, 1684-85 (2005).
3. Confirmation Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination ofAlberto R. Gonzales to
be Attorney General of the United States, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Dean Harold Koh).
4. Peter Brooks, The Plain Meaning of Torture?, SLATE, Feb. 9, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2113314.
5. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
olc/dagmemo.pdf [hereinafter Levin Memo].
6. See Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 225, 228 (2006).
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organization.7 Officials within the government reasoned that their best hope for
gathering intelligence was by questioning captured terrorist suspects.8 In
particular, the White House wanted to know how much pressure CIA interroga-
tors could exert on uncooperative Al Qaeda detainees like Abu Zubaydah. 9
It is against this backdrop that then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales
asked Yoo and Bybee to provide their construction of the Convention Against
Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman, Or Degrading Treatment, as implemented in
U.S. law.'o Yoo and Bybee explicitly state in the first paragraph of the Memo that
they understood this question to have "arisen in the context of interrogations
outside the United States.""
The Torture Memo's impact cannot be overstated. It was the basis for coercive
techniques used against several high-ranking detainees. 12 In January 2003,
then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld formed a working group to study
interrogation techniques. The group's analysis relied heavily on the Torture
Memo, incorporating much of the language verbatim into its own report. 13
Rumsfeld subsequently promulgated a list of aggressive interrogation procedures
to be used at Guantanamo Bay that eventually migrated to Iraq.' 4 When stories of
systematic abuse, mistreatment, and torture at U.S. detention facilities came to
light,' 5 many saw a direct connection between the Torture Memo and these
crimes. 16
There can be no doubt that the Torture Memo was horribly flawed legal
analysis. Legal ethics experts have claimed that the authors of the Torture Memo
7. Anthony Lewis, Introduction, in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at xiii.
8. See id.
9. See Vischer, supra note 6, at 235.
10. Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 172.
11. Id.
12. See David Johnston & James Risen, Aides Say Memo Backed Coercion Already in Use, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 2004, at Al, cited in Vischer, supra note 6, at 235.
13. See Luban, supra note 2, at 1454; see also Final Report of Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention
Operations (August 2004) [hereinafter Schlesinger Report], in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 911.
14. Schelinsger Report, supra note 13, at 911.
15. See, e.g., Schlesinger Report, supra note 13, at 914 (confirming sixty-six incidents of substantial abuse of
detainees); Mark Danner, We Are All Torturers Now, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A27; Dana Priest & Barton
Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogation: 'Stress and Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism
Suspects Held in Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST., Dec. 26, 2002, at AO1; Human Rights Watch, Getting Away
with Torture: Command Responsibility for the U.S. Abuse of Detainees (April 2005), available at http://hrw.org/
reports/2005/us0405 ("[I]t has become clear that torture and abuse have taken place not solely at Abu Ghraib but
rather in dozens of U.S. detention facilities worldwide, that in many cases the abuse resulted in death or severe
trauma, and that a good number of the victims were civilians with no connection to al-Qaeda or terrorism.").
16. See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 Am. J.
INT'L. L. 689, 691 (2004); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law
Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 836 (2005); Marcy
Strauss, The Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OIo ST. L.J. 1269, 1291 (2005) (arguing that Abu Ghraib teaches us
that torture should never be sanctioned).
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violated their professional duties. 17 Anthony Lewis equated the OLC's analysis
of torture to "the advice of a mob lawyer to a mafia don on how to skirt the law
and stay out of prison." 18 Some have gone further still, suggesting that the memo
exposes its authors to criminal liability.19
This Essay will use the Torture Memo to illustrate how lawyers might find
themselves implicated in war crimes. I will explore the contention that the
Torture Memo20 is not only flawed legal advice but potential evidence of criminal
conduct.
In Part I, I will address the flawed and reckless reasoning employed in the
Torture Memo. I argue that whether or not Yoo and Bybee wrote the
memorandum in good faith, the enterprise in which they were involved-
providing legal cover for the abuse of detainees-was morally hazardous. I argue
that there are some ends toward which lawyers should not direct their talents or
energies, and sanctioning the mistreatment of human beings is one such end.
When lawyers facilitate the degradation and torture of detainees, they can
justifiably be held accountable.
In Part II, I will demonstrate that lawyers are potentially complicit in war
crimes when they "materially contribute" to the commission of crimes like
torture. Writing a memorandum can qualify as a "material contribution," and
precedents before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") and the Nuremberg Tribunals suggest that lawyers can be held liable as
accomplices if their legal advice facilitated or encouraged the commission of
illegal acts.
In Part III, I will turn to potential venues for criminal prosecution of lawyers
like Yoo and Bybee and the sources of law that may be used to prosecute them.
American lawyers like Yoo and Bybee can potentially be prosecuted as war
criminals under the statute of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") 2' or in the
court of any party to the Convention Against Torture ("CAT").22 As I will explain,
it is irrelevant that the United States is not a party to the ICC because nationality
17. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Tortured Reasoning, AM. LAW., July 1, 2004, at 65; Jesselyn Radack, Tortured
Legal Ethics: The Role of the Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1 (2006); W.
Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CoRNELL L. REv. 67,98 (2005). For a
defense of the Torture Memo, see Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, A 'Torture'Memo and Its Tortuous Critics,
WALL ST. J., July 6, 2004, at A22.
18. Anthony Lewis, Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REv. BooKs, July 15,2004, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
17230.
19. See Philippe Sands, Policymakers on Torture-Take Note-Remember Pinochet, SAN FRAN. GATe, Nov.
13, 2005, at E .
20. My analysis focuses solely on the Torture Memo. For a broader argument that the Bush Administration's
lawyers have been complicit in the systematic violation of the Geneva Conventions, see Paust, supra note 16, at
811.
21. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25, 3(d), July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statutelromefra.htm [hereinafter ICC Statute].
22. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec.
10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
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is only one basis for the court's jurisdiction, 3 and the CAT prohibits complicity
in torture-whether by a lawyer or any other agent-irrespective of domestic
law. I also argue in this Part that Yoo and Bybee could be investigated and
charged in the United States, but the United States has been reluctant to examine
the role of policy-makers in the abuse and torture of detainees. The Supreme
Court's recognition that enemy combatants have rights under Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,24 seemed to open the door for such
25a prosecution, but the passing of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 seems
to make such a prosecution not only unlikely but perhaps impossible.2 6
Commenting on the Torture Memo controversy, George Terwilliger, a former
Deputy Solicitor General, expressed skepticism that legal opinions have ever hurt
anyone.7 I disagree. Lawyers must always consider the likely real world
consequences of their legal advice. While the exact influence of the Torture
Memo is unclear, Yoo and Bybee were in effect asked by the White House how
far interrogations could go, and their response was essentially "as far as you
would like."28 In crafting the Torture Memo in the manner they did, Yoo and
Bybee made the abuse and degrading treatment of detainees appear legally
permissible. As the analysis in this Essay suggests, Yoo and Bybee-and perhaps
other lawyers who have or will engage in similar activities-can and should be
held criminally accountable.
I. THE TORTURE MEMO: FAULTY AND RECKLESS
Numerous legal scholars have systematically deconstructed the shoddy
23. See generally id. art. 12.
24. 126 S. Ct. 2749,2796 (2006) (noting that common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions protects Hamdan
and other enemy combatants).
25. Implicit in Hamdan is the notion that since the United States ratified the Geneva Conventions, enemy
combatants enjoy rights under the Conventions as a matter of U.S. law. See id. at 2794. To violate these rights
therefore would be a violation not only of the Geneva Conventions but U.S. law. Moreover, the War Crimes Act,
18 U.S.C. § 2441, prohibits "grave breaches" of Geneva, and anyone involved in such breaches can be
prosecuted for war crimes. See generally Rosa Brooks, Did Bush Commit War Crimes?, L.A. TIMEs, June 30,
2006, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-brooks3Ojun30,0,339573.
column?coll =la-home-commentary.
26. The Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006). The Act
specifically defines what activities would constitute a war crime under 18 U.S.C. § 2441. "Outrages upon
personal dignity" and "humiliating and degrading treatment"--conduct prohibited under common article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions-are not listed in the Act. See also John Sifton, Criminal Immunize Thyself, SLATE,
Aug. 11, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2147585/.
27. See Vanessa Blum, Culture of Yes: Signing offon a Strategy, LEGAL TPMEs, June 14, 2004, at 1.
28. See Vischer, supra note 6, at 236. Following the reasoning of the memo, the Constitution empowers the
president to give blanket authorization for yanking fingernails, branding genitals with red hot pokers, or holding
suspects under water almost to the point of drowning. Stuart Taylor, Jr., It's Not Really Torture If... The
President's Lawyers Warp the Law, LEGAL TMEs, June 14, 2004, at 68; see also infra Part I.
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reasoning of the Torture Memo. 29 1 will not restate their analyses. I will instead
focus on the sections of the Torture Memo where Yoo and Bybee's advice appears
to be reckless 30 given the end to which it was to be used. Before doing so,
however, I will explain the nature of the task in which Yoo and Bybee were
engaged.
The Torture Memo begins by analyzing the definition of torture as imple-
mented in 18 U.S.C. § 2340(A).3' To violate section 2340(A), the statute requires
that (1) the torture occurred outside the United States; (2) the defendant acted
under the color of law; (3) the victim was within the defendant's custody or
control; (4) the defendant specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental
pain or suffering; and (5) the act inflicted severe physical or mental pain or
suffering.32 Yoo and Bybee were asked by the White House to focus on the fourth
and fifth elements.33
Yoo and Bybee first define "specific intent" very narrowly. They write, "In
order for a defendant to have acted with specific intent, he must expressly intend
to achieve the forbidden act .... [K]nowledge alone that a particular result is
certain to occur does not constitute specific intent."'34 Their definition presents a
gross simplification of a complex issue. As the Levin memo-which ultimately
superseded the work of Yoo and Bybee-notes, "[i]t is well recognized that the
term specific intent is ambiguous and that the courts do not use it consistently.,
35
The prevailing view among criminal law practitioners is that a person acts with
specific intent when he either desires the result of his conduct or the result is
practically certain to follow from his conduct.36 In the Torture Memo, however,
Yoo and Bybee equate specific intent with "purpose,, 37 without even acknowledg-
ing that their position could be perceived as legally controversial.
To be sure, lawyers can reasonably disagree about the meaning of "specific
intent." More important is that in response to a request for guidance on
interrogation procedures from the White House, Yoo and Bybee advised that
"[e]ven if the defendant knows that severe pain will result from his actions, if
29. See, e.g., Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture Under International
Law: The Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 9 (2005); Waldron, supra note 2, at
1703-09; Brooks, supra note 4.
30. "A person acts recklessly ... when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 2(c) (1962).
31. Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 172.
32. See id. at 174.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Levin Memo, supra note 5, at 16. The Levin Memo was produced by the White House's Office of Legal
Counsel in February 2005 to guide interrogations going forward; it explicitly rejected the Torture Memo's
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 2340(a). Id. at 1.
36. See Levin Memo, supra note 5, at 16 (citing I WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(a),
at 341 (2d ed. 2003). Yoo and Bybee refer to the same theorist (in the context of larceny) to support their view of
"specific intent." See Bybee memo, supra note 1, at 175.
37. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 2(a) (1962).
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causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite mens rea.'' 38 In fact,
Yoo and Bybee seemed to favor the infliction of pain on detainees when they note
that information gained from suspected Al Qaeda personnel could prevent attacks
equal or greater in magnitude to September lth.39 Their implication is clear:
because the Bush administration's goal is the security of the United States and not
cruelty for cruelty's sake, good faith actions by interrogators to stop future
terrorist attacks cannot be prosecuted as torture.4 ° Yoo and Bybee knew that their
work would be used to shape interrogation policy, and yet they were indifferent
as to how their legal advice would be applied in the real world by the Bush
administration. The Pentagon ultimately relied on this advice to sanction extreme
interrogation tactics including the use of deprivation of light, hooding, and even
exposure to cold weather and water-boarding at Guantanamo Bay.41
Yoo and Bybee engage in more "ends-justify-the means" lawyering at the end
of the Torture Memo when they suggest that there might be defenses to a
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2430(A).42 The authors write, "Standard criminal
law defenses of necessity and self-defense could justify interrogation methods
needed to elicit information., 43 There is nothing "standard" about this argument.
18 U.S.C. § 2340 mentions no defenses, and the Convention Against Torture
specifically states, "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of
war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency,
may be invoked as a justification of torture."44 A lawyer who gives a client advice
intended to provide a road map for the client in violating the law may be held
complicit in the client's criminal conduct,45 and Yoo and Bybee, by their own
admission, invoke these defenses so that interrogators can evade criminal liability
46in the event of future prosecution. If one follows the Torture Memo's reasoning,
whatever is done to a specific detainee (who may be detained by mistake or
simply have no information) can be justified by reference to the general threat
posed by Al Qaeda. As Professor Wendel suggests, "by talking loosely and
generally about necessity, [Yoo and Bybee] invite interrogators to conclude that
their conduct may be justified. 47
38. Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 175.
39. See id. at 202.
40. The Levin Memo repudiated this analysis. See Levin Memo, supra note 5, at 17.
41. See Department of Defense, Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies (Oct. 11, 2002)
[hereinafter DOD Legal Brief] in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 234-35. The Pentagon's work closely
tracks the legal analysis of Yoo and Byee: "The use of a wet towel to induce the misperception of suffocation
would also be permissible if not done with the specific intent to cause prolonged mental harm" (emphasis
added). Id. at 235.
42. Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 207-213.
43. Id.
44. CAT, supra note 22, art. 2(2).
45. See Bilder, supra note 16, at 694.
46. Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 207.
47. Wendel, supra note 17, at 84.
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The analysis of "severe pain" as a predicate for torture under 18 U.S.C. § 2340
is another example of lawyerly recklessness. Yoo and Bybee quickly move from a
dictionary definition of "severe pain" that is presumably too broad and
indeterminate for their purposes to a far narrower meaning.48 They do this by
locating the term "severe pain" in the United States Code in statutes that deal with
emergency medical conditions and the provision of medical benefits.4 9 Because
severe pain is an indicator of an emergency medical condition under these
statutes, and an emergency medical condition is one that is likely to result in
permanent and serious physical damage or organ failure, the authors argue that an
act is torture only if it produces pain that rises to "the level that would ordinarily
be associated with a sufficiently serious physical condition or injury such as
death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions."5°
Attempting to define "severe pain" in the context of torture by reference to the
definition used in a statute regarding medical benefits is both bizarre and
duplicitous. As Peter Brooks notes,
One might ask whether the use of "severe pain" in the context of medical
emergency is in fact more 'significant' than any number of other uses of severe,
in statutes and in ordinary usage. But this slide into medical usage allows
Bybee to come up with his interpretation of choice... He's by now got us well
out of common English usage and into the emergency room. 
5 1
Even if one presumes a good faith analysis by Yoo and Bybee, their interpretation
of "severe pain" is shoddy textualism. 52 What makes this advice arguably
criminal, however, is not so much that it is wrong but that the analysis turns the
prohibition against torture into something akin to "a speed limit which we are
entitled to push up against as closely as we can .... In response to a question
about the conduct of interrogations, Yoo and Bybee informed the White House
that an act is torture only if it brings about the pain that normally accompanies
death or organ failure. Under the standard advanced, interrogation techniques
such as water-boarding and exposure to cold weather approved of by the
Pentagon 54 and used at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib seem relatively tame.
48. See Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 176.
49. Id. (citations omitted).
50. Id.
51. Brooks, supra note 4.
52. Several commentators have noted that Yoo and Bybee blatantly misinterpreted the emergency medical
benefit statutes because the statutes do not purport to define "severe pain." Rather, the medical benefit statutes
note that severe pain is one type of symptom that would lead a person to believe he had an emergency medical
condition, where an emergency condition is one in which someone's health is in serious jeopardy, her bodily
functions might be impaired, or she is experiencing organ failure. In other words, the Torture Memo improperly
used the definition of emergency medical condition to define severe pain. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 2, at
1708; Wendel, supra note 17, at 81.
53. Waldron, supra note 2, at 1703.
54. See DOD Legal Brief, supra note 41 at 235.
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The Convention Against Torture ("CAT") prohibits both "cruel, degrading, and
inhuman treatment" as well as full-blown "torture. 55 Yoo and Bybee recognize
this but insist on drawing a line between the two acts. They indicate that "certain
acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but still not produce enough pain and
suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within section 2430(A)'s proscription
against torture."'56 Why do Yoo and Bybee place so much emphasis on this
distinction? They note that the United States attached a reservation when signing
the CAT that cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment means actions that violate
the Fifth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.57 The Bush administration has long
believed that CAT's prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
does not bind U.S. interrogators abroad because the constitutional amendments
cited in the reservation do not apply extraterritorially. 58 Thus, in narrowing the
definition of torture so that it only reaches "the most egregious conduct,, 59
Through their strained analysis, Yoo and Bybee stripped the CAT-the one
instrument that protects detainees--of much of its efficacy.6°
In summary, according to the Torture Memo, for an act to be "torture" the
interrogator must purposely intend to inflict "severe pain." Inflicting some pain is
acceptable, however, and is not "torture" as long as the interrogator stays away
from "the most heinous acts., 61 And, even if an interrogator commits both the
egregious act of torture (an act that must produce pain equivalent to that of organ
failure or severe bodily impairment) with the intent to purposely inflict pain (as
opposed to intending only to obtain valuable information), the Torture Memo
suggests that there are viable defenses in the event of criminal prosecution.
Although lawyers are entitled to a certain amount of creativity when
interpreting statutes, given its strained reasoning and dangerous implications, the
Torture Memo is best understood not as standard lawyering, but rather as legal
reassurance that interrogators can do as they please without fear of criminal
liability. Professor Waldron is undeniably correct in observing that the fact that
lawyers would provide legal justification for the degradation of fellow human
beings is a source of shame to the profession.62 More than this, however, Yoo and
55. CAT, supra note 18, arts. 1(1), 16(1).
56. Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 172.
57. See id. at 187 (interpreting Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 8, 25 (1990)).
58. See Luban, supra note 2, at 1458-59 (criticizing the Bush Administration's interpretation of the
reservation); see generally Marty Lederman, Administration Confirms Its View that CIA May Engage in 'Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading' Treatment, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 12, 2005), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/01/
administration-confirms-its-view-that.html.
59. Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 191.
60. The Bush Administration had concluded previously that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to
unlawful combatants. See Memorandum of President George Bush, Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter President Bush Memo], in THE ToRTURE PAPERS, supra note 1, at 135.
61. See Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 191.
62. See Waldron, supra note 2, at 1687.
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Bybee knew that their advice would be relied upon to shape interrogation
policies.63 Thus, they had a duty, not only as lawyers but also as moral agents, to
discharge their duties responsibly given the important use to which their efforts
were being directed.
Moral considerations are by no means foreign to the practice of law. Rule 2.1
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct specifically provides that "[iun
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations
such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation. ' 64 The Model Rules also prohibit lawyers from using their
talents to assist clients in engaging in criminal or fraudulent conduct. 65 Simply
put, lawyers can offer moral advice and most certainly cannot ignore what their
clients are going to do with their legal advice.
But whether or not Yoo and Bybee violated the legal profession's specific rules
of conduct in writing the Torture Memo, I think they most certainly failed to
discharge their duties as moral agents when they did so. Even if their legal
analysis was technically correct and the United States is legally justified in
employing dark interrogation methods on detainees that fall short of the "most
heinous" acts, the Torture Memo was a dangerous document.6 6 The notion that
interrogators can stop themselves at "mere" cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment and not graduate to full-blown torture is foolhardy, and Yoo and Bybee
would have realized as much.6 7
Lawyers are obviously permitted to consult with a client over the scope or
application of various laws.68 But when a lawyer recognizes (or should
recognize) that his/her legal advice is going to lead to the abuse of detainees, it is
fair to ask why he/she-as a moral agent-has agreed to provide the advice or, at
the very least, what he/she has done to minimize the negative consequences of the
advice. As T.M. Scanlon has argued, an individual acts in a morally impermis-
sible manner when he/she either follows a course of action in a full awareness of
the countervailing negative considerations or fails to notice that his/her action
entails a serious risk of harm to others.6 9 If Yoo and Bybee are not blameworthy
in the first sense, they are certainly blameworthy in the second.
Yoo and Bybee knew the White House wanted to formulate new interrogation
63. Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 172.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2004) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
65. MODEL RULES R. 1.2(d).
66. Waldron, supra note 2, at 1745 ("[W]e must not become so jaded that the phrase 'cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment' simply trips off the tongue as something much less taboo than torture .... To treat a
person inhumanly is to treat him in the way that that no human should ever be treated.").
67. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 1280 ("[The Administration... sent conflicting signals, creating a belief
that abusive behavior towards the 'evildoers' was acceptable. And policies adopted by the Administration at
least opened the door to utilizing torture in certain interrogation contexts. The end result.., condoned
aggressive interrogation practices, and ultimately, torture.").
68. MODEL RULES R. 1.2(d).
69. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OwE TO EACH OTHER 268-69 (2000).
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procedures for detainees. They also knew that, in the administration's view, the
Convention Against Torture was the only instrument that prevented interrogators
from engaging in coercive kinds of conduct.70 By narrowly interpreting the
Convention Against Torture and also suggesting possible defenses in the event of
persecution, Yoo and Bybee allowed the Bush Administration to adopt harsh new
standards for interrogations. In light of this, we would expect a modicum of
concern in the Memo for the well-being of the detainees or some consideration of
whether American personnel should be engaged in the business of using cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment on detainees. As argued, the Model Rules
contemplate that lawyers will offer moral advice to their clients, 7' and Yoo and
Bybee did not restrict themselves solely to legal arguments in the Torture
Memo.72 The only conclusion to draw from the failure of Yoo and Bybee to raise
any moral qualms about their extreme construction of the torture statute is they
simply did not care what happened to detainees in U.S. custody.
Arguably there are occasions when a lawyer's duties qua lawyer will trump his
duties as an individual moral agent. Confidentiality rules, for example, generally
prevent a lawyer from divulging the criminal conduct of his/her client,73 even if
the lawyer believes that the world would be better served if the client's misdeeds
were to come to light. But Yoo and Bybee did not find themselves torn between
their professional duties and the dictates of morality. They could have given some
consideration to the impact their advice would have on men in U.S. custody even
if they believed ultimately the United States was justified in adoping harsh new
interrogative tactics. Yoo and Bybee failed to voice any concern for the detainees,
not because their professional duties did not allow for it, but because they
believed that whatever happened to terrorist suspects was justified by relation to
the threat the U.S. was facing. In other words, they wrote the Torture Memo from
a particular moral framework, one that disregarded the consequences of
undermining the prohibitions against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment in both U.S. and international law. The stance of Yoo and Bybee
foreseeably led to a policy where detainees would be abused and tortured. For
their role in the mistreatement of terror suspects, Yoo and Bybee can and should
be held accountable.
II. ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND WORLD WAR I PRECEDENTS
Although Yoo and Bybee-and other lawyers like them-promulgated
policies in the War on Terror, they did not directly inflict torture or cruel and
70. See id. at 9.
71. MODEL RULES R. 2.1.
72. See Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 202 (noting that aggressive interrogations are needed to prevent future
attacks against the United States).
73. MODEL RutEs R.1.6(a).
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degrading treatment on detainees. Yoo and Bybee can only be held liable to the
extent they aided and abetted interrogators in committing war crimes. But can a
lawyer who merely writes a memo be implicated as an accomplice to the war
crime of torture? 74 I believe that he can.
Under international law, any act that materially contributes to the perpetration
of a war crime can make the actor an accomplice if the act is performed with the
requisite intent.75 Yoo and Bybee may not have intended for acts of torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment to take place, but they were at minimum
reckless as to the commission of such acts.76 Yoo and Bybee's recklessness in this
regard appears to meet the intent requirement for aiding and abetting war crimes
under international law. 77 As the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
("ICTY") expressed in Prosecutor v. Kvocka,78 "[t]he aider and abettor must...
at least have accepted that such a commission of a crime would be a possible and
foreseeable consequence of his conduct .... [I]t is not necessary that the aider or
abettor know the precise crime that was intended or which was actually
committed."
The precise level of contribution required for accomplice liability to attach to
one's actions is a more difficult question. The trials at Nuremberg required only
that an accomplice be "connected" to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
79
Conversely, the ICTY has held that the participation must have had a direct and
substantial effect on the commission of the offense. 80 The ICTY has interpreted
this to mean that "the criminal act would not have occurred in the same way had
not someone acted in the role that the accused in fact assumed., 81 The
International Criminal Court's statute is less restrictive, stating that a person is an
accomplice if he or she "aids, abets or otherwise assists in [a crime's] commission
or its attempted commission" or "[iun any other way contributes to the
commission or attempted commission of such a crime.",
82
The ICTY has held that under international law even omissions can constitute
74. "The term war crime is the technical expression for violations of the laws of warfare, whether committed
by members of the armed forces or by civilians." Paust, supra note 16, at n.3. Torture is a grave breach of the
Geneva Conventions and is therefore a war crime. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, art.130, Aug. 12, 1949, 47 Stat. 2021, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
75. See William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the Accomplices, 83
INT'L Rav. RED CROSS 446 (2001).
76. See supra Part I.
77. See Schabas, supra note 75, at 447 ("'T]he accomplice must have intended that the crime be committed
or may have been reckless as to its commission.") (emphasis added).
78. Case No. IT-98-39, Judgment, 255 (Nov. 2, 2001). Kvocka involved the abuse of men and women at
Serb-run detention camps in Bosnia. Id. 8.
79. Schabas, supra note 75, at 442.
80. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94010A, Judgment, U 691-92 (July 15, 1999).
81. Id. at 688.
82. ICC Statute, supra note 21, art. 25(3)(c)-(d).
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material contribution. 3 In Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, the Croatian commander of a
prison during the Bosnian War was found complicit in "outrages upon personal
dignity" for aiding and abetting the abuse and mistreatment of detainees.8 4
Although the commander did not mistreat prisoners directly and ran the prison
reasonably well given the dire circumstances, 5 he was present during interroga-
tions and remained silent when detainees were mistreated, facilitating the
misconduct.8 6 The ICTY Trial Chamber wrote, "By being present during the
mistreatment, and yet not objecting. . . the accused was necessarily aware that
such tacit approval would be construed as a sign of his support and encourage-
ment."
, 87
Ordinarily we would not expect lawyers to be present when their clients
commit criminal acts, and Yoo and Bybee were not present during any
interrogations of suspected terrorist detainees. Moreover, it is doubtful that any
interrogators actually read their memorandum. The Aleksovski court indicates
that these facts are not determinative, writing, "the act contributing to the
commission and the act of commission itself can be geographically and
temporally distanced."88 Similar to the prison commander in Aleksovski, Yoo and
Bybee appeared to encourage the cruel and degrading treatment of detainees.
They did not stay silent as the administration contemplated aggressive interroga-
tion procedures. Rather, by drafting the Terror Memo, Yoo and Bybee invited the
Bush administration to push up against the torture prohibition as closely as it
could89 and suggested possible defenses in the event interrogators were
prosecuted for war crimes like torture.
In trying to distinguish Aleksovski, one could argue that the prison commander
was in a position of authority, whereas Yoo and Bybee were mere lawyers
without any real control over the decisions of others, including interrogators.
However, this argument is belied by the fact that the Torture Memo was written in
response to a specific question from the White House on interrogation proce-
dures. The Pentagon may have formulated new interrogation procedures without
the assistance of Yoo and Bybee, but it is doubtful the procedures would have
been as extreme. Under international law, Yoo and Bybee are accomplices
because without their involvement, interrogation policies would not have been
83. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-39, 251 (Nov. 2, 2001) ("The actus reus required for
committing a crime is that the accused participated, physically or otherwise directly ... through positive acts or
omissions, whether individually or jointly with others.").
84. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, 29 (June 25, 1999).
85. Id. 235.
86. See id. U 87-88.
87. Id. 87.
88. Id. 62 (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94010A, Judgment, 698 (July 15, 1999)).
89. See Waldron, supra note 2, at 1703.
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implemented in quite the same way. 90 And, as World War II precedents show,
when the actions of lawyers directly impact how their clients' crimes are
perpetrated, then lawyers can be held liable as accomplices.
Courts have held that individuals can be complicit in war-time conduct to the
extent that they attempt to provide legal cover for illegal acts. 9 ' Joachim Von
Ribbentrop was the former German Ambassador to England92 who was charged
with crimes against the peace and other offenses before the International Military
Tribunal ("IMT"). 93 His defense was that he could not be held accountable for
Nazi Germany's aggressive actions against its neighbors because Hitler misled
him into believing that he was committed to peace. 94 The IMT rejected this
argument, noting that Von Ribbentrop had written the Foreign Office Memoranda
justifying Nazi preemptive strikes against Norway, Denmark, and other countries
in 1940. 95 The IMT indicated that Von Ribbentrop could not distance himself
from the very actions he had so aggressively supported.96 Similarly, Yoo and
Bybee advanced arguments in the Torture Memo that sought to aid interrogators
in circumventing both U.S. and international law by reclassifying what was
previously regarded as torture to 'merely' cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, as well as suggesting defenses to torture.9 7
Von Ribbentrop was not a lawyer, but numerous lawyers were implicated in
international crimes during World War 11.98 Franz Schlegelberger was a
distinguished jurist and head of the Reich Ministry of Justice. 99 He participated in
the enactment and enforcement of laws that persecuted Jewish and Polish
populations in German-occupied territories.'° Although he was never a great
admirer of Hitler and eventually resigned his position, Schlegelberger was found
guilty of both war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Nuremberg
Tribunal. 10 The tribunal noted that the persecution of people under the guise of
the law was an enterprise in which neither Schlegelberger nor any of his
colleagues should have been involved. 10 2 He was convicted even though the
court found that the legal system would have been worse off if another
90. See Tadic, 9M 691-92 ("[T]he criminal act would not have occurred in the same way had not someone
acted in the role that the accused in fact assumed.").
91. See generally Bilder, supra note 16, at 694.
92. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG 14
NOvEMBER 1945-1 OCrOBER 1946, at 285 (1947).
93. See id. at 285-88.
94. Id. at 287.
95. Id. at 286-87.
96. See id. at 287-88.
97. See supra Part I; see also Waldron, supra note 2, at 1745.
98. See Paust, supra note 16, at 811.
99. See 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NuERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
CouNcIL LAw No. 10, at 1081-82 (1951).
100. See id. at 1086.
101. See id. at 1086-87.
102. Id. at 1086.
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jurist-one whose views more closely tracked that of Hitler's-had been in his
place.10
3
The ultimate lesson of the Schlegelberger trial is that there are some ends to
which lawyers should not direct their talents; participating in the persecution of
'undesirables'--even if such persecution is consistent with domestic law-is one
example. Providing the legal justification for the abuse and brutalization of
detainees-even if the goal is to aid national security-may be another.
In a different case tried in post-World War II Germany, a lawyer was convicted
for his involvement with the Nazi Schutzstaffel (the "SS").1° The lawyer, Joseph
Alstoetter, was not aware of many of the activities of the SS or of the horrific
occurrences at concentration camps. 10 5 Nor did he write or enact any of the Nazi
regime's discriminatory laws. 106 Rather, Alstoetter's efforts were largely directed
at interpreting the laws the Nazis had passed. For example, he formulated rules
and procedures for the administration of hereditary biological courts that
determined whether certain Jews could be considered ethnically German. 107 The
Nuremberg Military Tribunal convicted him without considering whether he
approved of the Nazi persecution of Jews, saying
As a lawyer [Alstoetter] knew that in October of 1940 the SS was placed
beyond the reach of the law. As a lawyer he certainly knew... the Jews were
turned over to the police and so finally deprived of the scanty legal protection
they had theretofore had .... [H]e gave his name as a soldier and a jurist of
note and so helped to cloak the shameful deeds of that organization from the
eyes of the German people.108
After the Alstoetter case, the argument that a lawyer cannot be punished for
merely interpreting and implementing domestic law-no matter how morally
repulsive the law at issue is-is simply not credible. Yoo and Bybee used their
legal talents to deprive detainees of the protection of the Torture Convention, the
only instrument that, in the administration's view, had any bearing on the
interrogation of detainees abroad. Even if their intent was not to facilitate acts of
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, they, like Alstoetter, appeared
to play a vital role in lending credibility to the misdeeds of their superiors. This
being so, a court could certainly find that Yoo and Bybee "materially contributed"
to the commission of acts of abuse. While the unspeakable crimes of World War
II cannot and should not be equated with the reported incidents of torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees captured in the War on
Terror, ICTY and WWII precedents suggest that Yoo and Bybee can be held
103. Id.
104. See id. at 25, 1176-77.
105. Id. at 1176.
106. See id. at 1175.
107. See id. at 1176.
108. Id. at 1176-77.
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legally accountable for the Torture Memo.
III. SOURCES OF LAW AND VENUES FOR PROSECUTION
Thus far in this Essay, I have attempted to demonstrate that lawyers can be held
responsible for their involvement in denying individuals legal protections, as
well as for providing legal cover and legitimacy for illegal and immoral acts. The
argument can be made that, by writing the Torture Memo, Yoo and Bybee were
indifferent, if not encouraging of, the commission of acts of torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment. The Torture Memo might qualify as a material
contribution 0 9 to the commission of these acts, making Yoo and Bybee complicit
in their commission. This leads to the question of what a prosecution of Yoo and
Bybee for war crimes might look like. Where could they be tried and under what
law could they be prosecuted?
A. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: THE ICC
The International Criminal Court ("ICC") was established by the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court ("ICC Statute") on July 17, 1998 and is
currently in the process of beginning operations."° The United States is not a
party to the ICC, having revoked its signature on May 6th, 2002. 11 Nevertheless,
the ICC still has the potential to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. nationals like Yoo
and Bybee. According to Article 12 of the ICC Statute, the ICC can exercise
jurisdiction over crimes that occur on the territory of any one of the state-parties
to the court. 112 Even if a state is not a state-party to the ICC Statute, it can allow
the ICC to excercise jurisdiction with respect to specific crimes committed within
its territory. 1 3 For this reason, American lawyers should be mindful that the ICC
may have jurisdiction over their actions that have an impact abroad. While Yoo
and Bybee's actions took place within the United States, the crimes for which
they might bear complicity occurred abroad, meaning that they are not immune
from the ICC's jurisdiction.
With regards to the War on Terror, the United States is conducting interroga-
tions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, as well as certain "black sites"
in Eastern Europe.'1 4 Afghanistan is a party to the ICC, whereas Iraq and Cuba
109. Schabas, supra note 75, at 446.
110. See Historical Introduction to the International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/
history.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
111. See BBC News, US Renounces World Court Treaty, May 6, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
americas/1970312.stm.
112. ICC Statute, supra note 21, art. 12(2)(a).
113. Id. art. 12(3).
114. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at AO1.
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are not.' t5 Since the War on Terror began, there have been credible stories of
detainees being abused and tortured in Bagram and other parts of Afghanistan. 116
The ICC could attempt to hold Yoo and Bybee accountable for these acts, as the
court would have jurisdiction over the crimes. Although the United States has a
so-called Article 98 Agreement" 7 in place with Afghanistan," 8 the Agreement
only prevents Afghanistan from turning U.S. nationals over to the ICC; it does
not prevent a third state from turning over U.S. nationals found within its territory
who aided and abetted crimes committed in Afghanistan. Another possibility is
for the ICC to obtain consent from Iraq and/or Cuba to exercise jurisdiction over
crimes committed by U.S. nationals within their respective territories. Such
consent would probably not be given by Iraq which is currently an ally of the
United States. However, Cuba-which retains ultimate sovereignty over Guan-
tanamo Bay" 9-- could, if it chose, allow the ICC to exercise jurisdiction. Under
such circumstances, if Yoo and Bybee were present in any country that is a party
to the ICC and has not signed an Article 98 Agreement, the lawyers could be
transferred to the Hague to answer charges related to the mistreatment of
detainees in Cuba.
Americans would undoubtedly be less-than-enthused if an international court
attempted to prosecute Yoo, Bybee, or indeed any U.S. national. Given that the
ICC is supposed to exercise jurisdiction over the "most serious crimes of
international concern,"1 20 it would be within a prosecutor's discretion not to
focus on the actions of individuals like Yoo and Bybee. Nevertheless, the ICC is
by no means precluded from prosecuting crimes related to the mistreatment and
torture of detainees or from exercising jurisdiction over U.S. nationals.
The ICC regards torture as both a crime against humanity and a war crime,
12 1
and the ICC Statute criminalizes the commission of "other inhumane acts... caus-
ing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health" as a
crime against humanity and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
115. See generally Press Release, International Criminal Court, Fourth Session of the Assembly of States
Parties Opens 28 November 2005 (Nov. 27, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/
123.html.
116. See, e.g., Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of2 Afghan Inmates'Deaths, N.Y. TIMEs, May 20,
2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/internationallasial2Oabuse.html?ex= 1145937600&en=
6eel6c06af3bl lcf&ei=5070; Josh White, New Reports Surface About Detainee Abuse, WASH. POST, Sept. 24,
2005, at A01.
117. See ICC Statute, supra note 21, art. 98(2).
118. U.S. Dept. of State, Countries Who Have Signed Article 98 Agreements with the United States, June 12,
2003, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/21539.htm. Article 98 Agreements prevent the transfer
of U.S. personnel to the Hague or any other international tribunal. Id.
119. The United States occupies Guantanamo under a lease that recognizes Cuba's ultimate sovereignty, but
gives the United States control for so long as it does not abandon the leased areas. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 471 (2004).
120. See ICC Statute, supra note 21, art. 1.
121. See id. arts. 17, 7(l)(f), 8(2)(a)(ii).
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humiliating and degrading treatment" as war crimes.1 22 Responsibility extends
not only to principals, but also to anyone who, "[f]or the purpose of facilitating
such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or attempted
commission"1 23 or "[in any other way contributes to the commission or
attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a
common purpose."1 24 The ICC Statute, therefore, clearly criminalizes both acts
of torture and of cruel and degrading treatment, 125and liability under the ICC
Statute extends not only to those who directly commit the acts, but also to
accomplices and facilitators, including lawyers.
The ICC Statute does have some requirements for an action to be either a
"crime against humanity" or a war crime. Under the ICC Statute, to rise to the
level of a "crime against humanity," an act must have been conmmitted as part of
"a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population." 126 Furthermore,
the ICC Statute defines "attack directed against a civilian population" as a
"course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts [such as murder,
rape and torture] against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of
a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack."1 27 Although the
United States is engaged in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S.
military forces are not targeting civilians or engaging in a "widespread and
systematic" attack on a civilian population. And because the cruel and degrading
treatment and torture of detainees is not part of an effort to terrorize the civilian
populations of Afghanistan and Iraq (let alone in Cuba), Yoo and Bybee could not
be implicated in crimes against humanity-at least not before the ICC.
Conversely, war crimes like torture and "outrages upon personal dignity" need
only to be associated with an international armed conflict. 128 This element is
clearly met, as the interrogations of enemy combatants are taking place against
the backdrop of a transnational war with Al Qaeda-as the Bybee memo makes
clear.129 Under the ICC Statute, to be an accomplice to either the war crime of
torture or to "outrages upon personal dignity," Yoo and Bybee would also have to
122. See id. arts. 7(1)(k), 8(2)(b)(xxi).
123. Id. art. 25(3)(c).
124. Id. art. 25 (3)(d).
125. For ICC purposes, this would trump Yoo and Bybee's claim that the U.S. forces have a right to use cruel
and degrading treatment under the Torture Convention.
126. ICC Statute, supra note 21, art. 7(2)(a).
127. Id.
128. See Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Crim. Ct., Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N.
Doc. PCNICC/2001/I/Add.2, art. art. 8(2)(a)(1)-I, 8(2)(b)(xxi) (2000) [hereinafter Elements], available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NOO/24/27/PDFINO072427.pdf?OpenElemnt. The ICC Statute
also covers these crimes if they are committed as a part of an armed conflict not of an international character. See
id. art. 8(2)(c)(i)-(iv).
129. See Bybee Memo, supra note I, at 200; see also President Bush Memo, supra note 60, at 135 ("[T]he
relevant conflicts are international in scope.").
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have acted with the purpose of facilitating these crimes 130 or contributed to the
commission of these crimes with the knowledge that the administration's
intention was to commit them. 131
Presumably Yoo and Bybee would respond that their purpose in writing the
Memo was not to facilitate torture but rather to give the Bush administration as
much flexibility as possible in crafting aggressive interrogation procedures.
1 32
Yoo and Bybee can further defend themselves by claiming that while they
suggested possible defenses to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2430(A), they did
not know that the administration was in fact "planning" to commit the egregious
conduct of torture. 133 The ICC prosecutor would therefore have to prove that the
administration did plan to torture detainees and that Yoo and Bybee either wrote
the Torture Memo in order to facilitate such conduct or that they had knowledge
that the administration would likely commit torture. Most commentators have
noted that torture was a foreseeable consequence of the administration's policy:
Yoo and Bybee must have known that some interrogators would graduate from
the use of "mere" cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment to full-blown torture. 1
34
In any case, at a minimum, Yoo and Bybee purposely facilitated the
commission of the war crime of "outrages upon personal dignity."' 135 The Bush
administration's position has been that the Convention Against Torture does not
prevent the cruel and degrading treatment of aliens held overseas. 136 This
explains, for example, why detainees captured in the War on Terror have been
held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and not within the United States proper, and
why the administration sought Yoo and Bybee's exact construction of the torture
statute. Thus, the administration planned to inflict some cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment on detainees, and by redefining much of what would
normally be considered torture as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, 137 Yoo
and Bybee gave the administration as much latitude as possible in conducting
interrogations. Giving the administration leeway to use aggressive interrogation
techniques was a specific goal of Yoo and Bybee because they believed that
extreme tactics were necessary to prevent a repeat of September lth.138 And,
even if they did not purposely encourage the use of such tactics, at the very least
they wrote the Torture Memo with the knowledge that the Administration was
likely to authorize their use by CIA interrogators. Indeed, the ICC Statute defines
130. See ICC Statute, supra note 21, art. 25(3)(c).
131. See id. art. 25(3)(d).
132. See id. art. 25(3)(c).
133. See id. art. 25(3)(d).
134. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 2, at 1449 ("Without clear lines, the tyranny innate in the interrogator's job
has nothing to hold it in check."); Strauss, supra note 16, at 1290-91.
135. See ICC Statute, supra note 21, art 8(2)(b)(xxi).
136. See Luban, supra note 2, at 1458-59.
137. See Waldron, supra note 2, at 1744-45.
138. See Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 202.
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knowledge as "awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur
in the ordinary course of events,"'1 39 and because the Memo was written to help
CIA interrogators with extracting information from otherwise uncooperative
detainees like Abu Zubaydah, 140 Yoo and Bybee would be hard-pressed to argue
that they did not expect the administration to make use of the full arsenal of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading tactics deemed permissible in the Torture Memo.
Under the ICC Statute, therefore, Yoo and Bybee could be tried as accomplices
to outrages upon personal dignity and perhaps for torture. I doubt very much that
Yoo and Bybee expected that their actions ran afoul of the ICC Statute when they
wrote the Memo but, as I have attempted to show in this Essay, the notion of
accomplice liability under the ICC Statute allows for the potential prosecution of
U.S. lawyers insofar as they are implicated in war crimes.
B. PROSECUTIONS BY STATE PARTIES TO THE CAT
The Convention Against Torture also allows for the prosecution of lawyers as
accomplices to war crimes. Article 4 of the CAT prohibits "complicity in torture,"
and Article 5(2) demands that "[e]ach State Party shall likewise take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in
cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction
and it does not extradite him."' 14 1 In Exparte Pinochet Ugarte, Spain attempted to
secure the extradition of August Pinochet, the former Chilean dictator. To
extradite Mr. Pinochet, the British courts had to first determine whether Mr.
Pinochet was complicit in war crimes. 142 In its decision, the House of Lords
determined that Mr. Pinochet was complicit in torture and stated, "If... states do
not choose to seek extradition or to prosecute the offender, other states must do
so. The purpose of the Convention was to introduce the principle aut dedere aut
punire-either you extradite or you punish."'143 The CAT treats torture as a crime
of universal jurisdiction, and by seeking Pinochet's extradition from England for
crimes he committed in Chile, the Spanish government was acting pursuant to its
obligation to prosecute torture wherever it occurs.' 44
The CAT does not prohibit complicity in cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment. Article 16 mandates that states "shall undertake to prevent in any
territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment which do not amount to torture."' 14 5 Under its domestic law,
139. ICC Statute, supra note 21, art. 30(3).
140. See Vischer, supra note 6, at 235.
141. CAT, supra note 18, arts. 4, 5(2).
142. See Exparte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 AC 147, 200 (H.L 1999) (appeal taken from Spain), 22
[hereinafter Pinochet 3].
143. Id.
144. See id. at 201.
145. CAT, supra note 22, art. 16(1).
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therefore, a state may choose to prosecute not only those who commit acts of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment but those who aid and abet these acts.
However, there is no universal jurisdiction for cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment. In other words, under the CAT, states are not required to prosecute or
extradite for cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, whereas extradition or
prosecution is mandatory for torture. 
146
Because of this, Yoo and Bybee can only be prosecuted under the CAT to the
extent that their crimes rise to the level of complicity or participation in torture,
not in cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 147 To be prosecuted for cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment, Yoo and Bybee--or other lawyers like
them-would have to be physically present in the territory of a country where the
crimes were actually committed, and the state's domestic law would have to go
beyond what the CAT requires. The country's domestic law would have to
explicitly criminalize complicity in cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
Yoo and Bybee would be liable for complicity or participation in torture 14 8 if
the Torture Memo is read to endorse torture. A court would likely have to
conclude that the Memo's discussion of defenses like necessity and self-
defense-as well as Yoo and Bybee's attempt to re-categorize acts of torture as
'mere' cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment-led to the commission of acts of
torture. Moreover, the court prosecuting Yoo and Bybee would have to conclude
that the lawyers had the requisite mens rea. Of course, countries will have
different legal standards and burdens of proof for determining mens rea.
However, it still might be easier to mount a prosecution under the CAT than one
under the ICC Statute. This is because the mens rea required for complicity is not
specified in the CAT; rather, its determination is left to domestic courts. The ICC
Statute, as I have noted in this Essay, does not have a separate crime of complicity
in torture, and the mens rea required for accomplice liability is purpose or
knowledge. 149 Therefore, many state-parties to the CAT would likely hold Yoo
and Bybee liable as long as the lawyers disregarded the possibility that the
Torture Memo would lead individual interrogators to commit acts of torture.
1 50
What is most important, however, is that American lawyers could be prosecuted
even if their actions were perfectly consistent with U.S. law.
The Pinochet precedent, as Philippe Sands has suggested,15' is highly relevant
on this point. General Pinochet was charged by the Spanish government with
complicity in torture and other war crimes. 152 Chile, where most of the alleged
146. See id. art. 5 (noting that art. 5 does not apply to acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment).
147. See id. art. 4(1).
148. See id.
149. See supra Part Ill.A.
150. See Schabas, supra note 75, at 447.
151. See Sands, supra note 19.
152. Pinochet3, supra note 142, at 190-91.
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acts occurred, did not believe that the General should be prosecuted and fought
his extradition to Spain. 153 Indeed, under Chilean law, General Pinochet enjoyed
complete immunity pursuant to a general amnesty. 154 General Pinochet was
arrested in London pursuant to the Spanish warrant, and the question for the
House of Lords was whether the United Kingdom was bound by Chilean law and
required to afford the General immunity from both prosecution and extradition.
The House concluded that it was not, noting that "[m]unicipal law cannot be
decisive... If it were a determining factor, the most abhorrent municipal laws
might be said to enlarge the functions of a head of state." 155 The House further
noted that, regardless of what domestic law said about the powers and liabilities
of General Pinochet, "international law has made plain that certain types of
conduct, including torture... are not acceptable conduct on the part of anyone.
This applies as much to heads of state.., as it does to everyone else; the contrary
conclusion would make a mockery of international law." 1
56
The Pinochet case demonstrates that even if Yoo and Bybee were correct that,
as a matter of domestic U.S. law, torture applies only to the most egregious
abusive conduct,157 and that there are defenses for interrogators charged with
torture, none of this shields those who violate international norms against torture
from liability in foreign courts. In signing the CAT, the United States "assented to
the imposition of an obligation on foreign national courts to take and exercise
criminal jurisdiction in respect of the official use of torture." 58 A foreign court
would therefore be free to make its own judgment about where the line between
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment lies and whether it has in fact
been crossed. A foreign court would certainly question the claim made by Yoo
and Bybee that international law does not view interrogation techniques like wall
standing, hooding, subjection to noise, sleep deprivation, and deprivation of food
and water as torture.' 59 It would similarly question the notion that an act is not
torture if it is motivated by the desire to obtain information. Given that there
recently has been a great deal of international law on the CAT-all of which was
utterly ignored by Yoo and Bybee-a court might conclude that their analysis
was conducted in bad faith and that Yoo and Bybee wished to see detainees
tortured for the sole purpose of obtaining valuable information. American
lawyers are not solely responsible for complying with American law, and they
should expect that their actions that have an impact abroad would be inquired into
153. See id. at 17; see also Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2), [2000] 1 AC 61 (H.L. 1998) (appeal taken from
Spain), 26 [hereinafter Pinochet 2].
154. Pinochet3, supra note 142, at 17.
155. Id. at 10.
156. Id. at 6.
157. Id. at 191.
158. See Pinochet 3, supra note 142, at 277-78.
159. See Bybee Memo, supra note 1, at 197; see also Rouillard, supra note 29, at 34-36 (criticizing Yoo and
Bybee for basing their analysis on only two outdated cases).
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by foreign courts.
Yoo and Bybee could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2340(C) for conspiracy
in torture and perhaps even for war crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 2441.160 Domestic
prosecution would involve many of the same issues that have been discussed in
the context of international trials. To Yoo and Bybeehe, the prospect of a
domestic investigation, let alone prosecution, is probably too remote to consider.
Yoo and Bybee should not take much solace, however. For, as this Essay has
proven, the ICC and individual state-parties to the CAT could attempt to hold
them responsible for their role in the abuse, mistreatment, and torture of detainees
captured and interrogated in the War on Terror. American lawyers like Yoo and
Bybee who have contributed to or who continue to contribute to the commission
of war crimes against detainees need not fear prosecution only so long as they
remain within United States.
CONCLUSION
The prohibitions against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment are
among the most fundamental legal principles of the international community that
cannot and should not be evaded. 161 When lawyers seek to undermine or flout
these prohibitions, as this Essay has attempted to show, they can be held
accountable.
As flawed as the legal reasoning of the Torture Memo was, it is the context in
which the Memo was written that makes it arguably criminal. Yoo and Bybee
knew that their work would be used as a guide to develop detainee interrogation
procedures. In spite of this knowledge, they produced a Memo that authorized the
brutalization of detainees, narrowed the prohibition against torture, and sug-
gested that an interrogator who tortures for the purpose of eliciting information
that might be useful to fight the War on Terror lacks the specific intent required
for their actions to constitute torture. Yoo and Bybee also argued that interroga-
tors accused of torture had viable defenses in the event of prosecution. At a
minimum, Yoo and Bybee were reckless as to the commission of acts of torture
and appeared to outright encourage the cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of
detainees by U.S. interrogators. Without their work, the Bush Administration
would not have felt legally entitled to adopt harsh new interrogation procedures.
As the trials in post-World War II Germany clearly indicate, there are some things
lawyers should refuse to do for their clients, and when lawyers are involved in the
160. Yoo and Bybee would have to have committed a "grave breach" of the Geneva Conventions under 18
U.S.C. §2441; complicity in torture is not defined by the conventions as such. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (c)(1),
(c)(3) (2000), with Geneva Convention, supra note 74, arts. 3, 130. Paust has suggested the conspiring to deny
individuals the legal protections is a war crime under the Geneva Conventions that can be prosecuted
domestically in either a court or military tribunal. See Paust supra note 16 at 861-63.
161. See Pinochet 3, supra note 142; see also Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[The]
absolute prohibition on torture could not be clearer .... Even in war, torture is not authorized.").
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persecution and mistreatment of others, they can be held legally accountable.
The International Criminal Court could assume jurisdiction over U.S. crimes
and is not prevented from prosecuting lawyers like Yoo and Bybee. It is irrelevant
that the United States is not a party to the ICC Statute because, as discussed, the
court has other means of obtaining jurisdiction. Prosecution is also possible under
the CAT because torture is a crime of universal jurisdiction, and other nations are
not only able, but obligated, to hold lawyers accountable to the extent that they
are complicit in torture. The argument that U.S. lawyers only need to be
concerned about potential prosecution under U.S. law is therefore both dangerous
and erroneous.
If we hold lawyers like Yoo and Bybee liable for the legal advice they give, is
there a risk that lawyers may be chilled from performing the vital task of
interpreting the law as they see it? I do not think so. As this Essay has argued, Yoo
and Bybee did not merely interpret the law. Rather, in response to a request for
guidance about detainee interrogation procedures, they argued that it was legally
permissible for the United States government to mistreat detainees and perhaps
even torture them. Yoo and Bybee did not consider weaknesses in their arguments
or suggest the dangers that might result if their guidance was in fact implemented.
As moral agents, lawyers must always be cognizant of the real world conse-
quences of their actions and offer responsible legal advice to their clients. A law
degree does not entitle one to aid in the abuse, degradation, or torture of
detainees, just as it does not allow one to assist in the legal persecution of
minority populations.162 If the individuals who execute illegal orders can be held
responsible for their actions, then surely so can the lawyers who helped formulate
the orders upon which those individuals relied.
162. See supra Part I (discussing the prosecutions of Schlegelberger and Alstoetter).
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